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II. ARROW S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM:

AN INFORMATIONAL INTERPRETATION
Arrow's impossibility theorem can be shown to be closely related to the nature of the informational restrictions implicit in these conditions. In this section this relationship will be brought out and the proof of the theorem will be set up in a way that makes the informational constraints transparent. Arrow defined a social welfare function (SWF) as a function that determines one social welfare ordering R of the set of social states for every combination of individual utility orderings of that set -one ordering for each person. In confining attention to the combination of individual orderings taken on their own, both ordinalism and non-comparable utilities are incorporated in the very conception of a SWF. In addition another general structural condition was used, namely unrestricted domain, so that the domain of the SWF was required to include every logically possible combination of individual orderings. Also the set of individuals is taken to be finite and the number of distinct social states at least three.
Arrow invoked a weak version of the Pareto principle.
Weak Pareto Principle. If everyone has more utility in x than in y, then x is socially better than y.
In addition, he imposed two other conditions. The condition of non-dictatorship demands that there should be no one such that whenever he strictly prefers any x to any y, then invariably x is regarded as socially better than y. And finally, there was the much-debated condition of independence.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. The social ranking of any pair of states must be the same as long as the individual utility information about the pair remains the same, which, in the special case of ordinal noncomparable utilities, amounts to individual orderings over the pair remaining the same. ' Arrow's 'impossibility theorem' establishes that there is no SWF satisfying all these four conditions.2 I would like to argue that the impossibility can be seen as resulting from combining a version of welfarism ruling out the use of non-utility information with making the utility information remarkably poor (particularly in ruling out interpersonal utility comparisons). While the poverty of the utility information is part of the basic framework explicitly invoked, ruling out the use of non-utility information is the result of the combination of conditions used. Welfarism implies independence of irrelevant alternatives, 1 I have defined here the condition of independence rather less demandingly than Arrow both (i) in permitting the use of cardinality and interpersonal comparability if such information is available, and (ii) in making no demands on choices over sets larger than pairs. This permits the use of this condition in frameworks other than Arrow's (e.g. to derive litilitarianism), which have a richer informational base, and also in cases where binariness of social choice is not required; see Sen (1977a, I8-2 but is not implied by it. However, the conditions of independence, weak Pareto principle and unrestricted domain put together imply a weak version of welfarism. Any SWF satisfying these three conditions may be called an 'Arrovian' social welfare function.
Strict-ranking Welfarism. If individual utility rankings are strict, then any two social states must be ranked entirely on the basis of personal utilities in the respective states. ' In fact, if the weak Pareto principle is replaced by the 'Pareto indifference rule' (demanding that personal indifference by all must together imply social indifference), then the three conditions (i.e. unrestricted domain, independence and the Pareto indifference rule) will imply welfarism fully.2 But even the weak Pareto principle is adequate to imply strict-ranking welfarism, when combined with unrestricted domain and independence (as in the Arrow framework). This is established below for 'Arrovian' social welfare functions with individual utilities ordinal and non-comparable. In this framework strictranking welfarism demands that if everyone's ranking of x vis-a-vis y in one case is the same as his or her ranking of a vis-a-vis b in another, then the social ranking of x vis-a-vis y in the first case must be the same as the social ranking of a vis-a-vis b respectively in the second. Let the community be partitioned into two groups M and N, with everyone in M preferring x to y in case as and a to b in case fi, while everyone in N prefers y to x in case as and b to a in case f.3 (Cases as and ft may or may not represent the same set of utility orderings over the whole set of social states in the two cases.) Strict-ranking welfarism demands that if x is socially preferred to y in case as, then a is socially preferred to b in case ,; similarly if y is socially preferred to x in the first case then b is socially preferred to a in the second. Furthermore, strict-ranking welfarism also demands that if x is socially indifferent to y in case as, then a is socially indifferent to b in case f. The nature of the social states and their non-utility features should not make any difference to social preference as long as the utility information about them (in this case, the personal strict utility rankings) is the same.
In demonstrating this we do not need the full force of transitivity of social preference. Transitivity of social strict preference (but not necessarily of indifference) is enough; this is called quasi-transitivity. 1 This may appear to be substantially more demanding than the 'neutrality' condition used by Blau (I972) as an intermediate product in establishing the impossibility result, especially since Blau confined his attention not merely to strict individual preferences but also to strict social preferences -a constraint not used in the definition of' strict-ranking welfarism'. However, as the proof of (T. i) makes clear, the case of social indifference is covered as a consequence of the case with strict social preference.
2 See Guha ( 972) and d'Asprernont and Gevers (i 977), dealing respectively with the informational framework of individual non-comparable orderings and a more general framework covering richer informational availability as well. Guha's axioms were, however, too weak since he took the Pareto principle in the 'weak' form which did not cover the case of individual indifference (see Blau (1976) ), while d'Aspremont and Gevers took axioms that were a bit too strong since they assumed the 'strong' Pareto principle whereas the Pareto indifference rule is sufficient for their result -and indeed for their own proof (see Sen, I977b, and also Roberts, I978). 8 The word 'preference' has some ambiguity since it can be defined in different ways which are not necessarily equivalent (see Sen, I977c) . Here the interpretation intended is that of personal utility, in the sense of a person's conception of his own well-being (see also Sections III and VII below Since everyone's utility ranking of x vis-a-vis y in this regime is the same as in the ac regime, by independence of irrelevant alternatives x must be judged to be socially better than y in the y regime, as in the as regime. By the weak Pareto principle, in the y regime, a is socially better than x, and also y is socially better than b. Thus, by quasi-transitivity of social preference (i.e. transitivity of strict social preference), a is socially better than b in the y regime. Since the utility information regarding a vis-a-vis b in the y and ft regimes is identical, by independence it follows that in the f regime too a must be preferred to b.
This covers the case of strict social preference,' leaving us only with the case in which x is socially indifferent to y in the at regime.
In the indifference case, it would have to be established that a is indifferent to b in the f regime. Suppose not. Then a is preferred to b, or vice versa, and let it be the former, without loss of generality. If a is preferred to b in the f regime, then by the above proof of strict-ranking welfarism in the case of strict social preference, it follows that x must be socially preferred to y in the as regime, since the utility information regarding x vis-a-vis y is the same in the as regime as that regarding a vis-a-vis b, respectively, in the /? regime. But this contradicts the postulation that x and y are socially indifferent in the as regime. And that establishes strict-ranking welfarism in the case of social indifference as well. The effect of (T. I) is to combine the poverty of the utility information with an embargo on the use of non-utility information. This restricts the class of social welfare rules to a very narrow group. The requirement of completeness rules out such partial procedures as the Pareto ranking being the only method of social judgement. The requirement of consistency in the form of transitivity of social preference rules out such procedures as the method of majority ranking. We would be left with nothing other than dictatorial rules. This is demonstrated now.
Define a group M of persons as 'almost decisive' over the same ordered pair x, y, if and only if x is socially preferred to y whenever everyone in group M strictly prefers x to y while everyone not in group M strictly prefers y to x. The group M is called 'decisive' oVer x, y, if and only if x is socially preferred to y whenever everyone in M strictly prefers x to y, no matter what others prefer.' (T. 2) Irrelevance of Opposition. For all 'Arrovian' Social welfare functions (even with transitivity of social preference relaxed to quasi-transitivity), if any group is almost decisive over some ordered pair of states, it is decisive over that ordered pair of states, i.e. it does not need to be opposed to win.
Let group M be almost decisive over x, y. To show that it is fully decisive over the pair x, y, postulate the following preference combination: everyone in M prefers x to some third alternative z and that to y, while everyone not in M prefers z to both x and y, which can be ranked in any way whatsoever vis-a-vis each other. By (T. I) M is almost decisive also over x, z, and hence x is socially preferred to z. By the weak Pareto principle, z is socially preferred to y. By quasi-transitivity of social preference, x is socially preferred to y, and that is so irrespective of how those who are not in M rank x vis-a-vis y. Thus (T. 2).
By virtue of (T. I) and (T. To take an over-all view of the proof, (T. I) eliminates any essential use of non-utility information (such as the nature of the social states), adding to the informational penury incorporated in the conditions, explicitly, in the form of poor utility information (non-comparable individual utility orderings). (T. 2) and (T. 3) capitalise on the fact that we are -by virtue of this total informational poverty -confined to social welfare rules of very simple kinds, e.g. majority rule, dictatorship, etc. Given that, the requirements of completeness and transitivity of social preference force us to go relentlessly in the direction of recognising more and more information as unusable until we have the consistency of a dictatorial procedure, concentrating on the information in just one person's preference ordering.1
It is often asserted that the Arrow impossibility theorem is some kind of a generalisation of the old 'paradox of voting'. This is so in the rather limited sense that the informational exclusions do ultimately confine us to simple welfarist rules (ignoring non-utility information) with utility reflected by the set of individual orderings only (ignoring interpersonal comparisons and cardinality), and all these rules -with the exception of dictatorship -run into consistency problems as the majority rule does in the 'paradox of voting'. But we need not have found ourselves confined to such a limited field had there not been such informational exclusions forcing us to make social welfare judgements in an informational famine. It is only after the informational constraints have bitten in that the analogy with the paradox of voting becomes relevant. In fact, the strategy of proof used above can be easily extended to apply to such weaker consistency conditions. Take, for example, the case of semi-transitivity, which requires that if x is strictly preferred to y, and that to z, then for any other state s, either x is preferred to s, or s is preferred to z (or both). Since semi-transitivity implies quasi-transitivity, (T. i) and (T. Returning to the income distributional conflict, it can be seen as a classic case of aggregation of conflicting interests. In terms of individual orderings of utility, it might be the case that each person is better off with the unit of additional income coming to him rather than to anyone else. And this can hold no matter whether the person is rich or poor. The question then is, on what basis do we discriminate in favour of the poor vis-a-vis the rich in the Arrovian framework applied to the case of interest aggregation?
Can we identify the rich through the observation that they have more utility than the poor? Not in the Arrow framework, since interpersonal comparisons are not admitted. Perhaps as those. with a lower marginal utility of income? No, of course not, since that will go against -both noncomparability and ordinalism. Can we then distinguish the rich as those who happen to have more income, or more consumer goods (nothing about utility need be said), and bring this recognition to bear in social judgments? No, not that either, since this will go against welfarism (and against strict-ranking-welfarism), since this discrimination has to be based on non-utility information.
'Social utility', in Leontief's characterisation, as 'a function of the ordinally described personal utility levels' without interpersonal comparisons robs us of our ability to 'tell' effectively the rich from the poor. It is this peculiarity 1 See Sen (I 977 a). The exercise can also be of a mixed kind, aggregating both interests and judgements; see Graaff (I977 It is, however, easy to establish that dropping 'ordinalism' and permitting, in principle, the use of cardinal utility has no effect on the impossibliity result so long as the rest of the Arrow framework is kept unchanged, in particular the ,exclusion of interpersonal comparability of utility (see Theorem 8*2 in Sen Interpersonal comparability without cardinality is, however, a way out of the impossibility. Ordinal comparisons of different persons' utilities permit the use of such criteria as Rawls's (I97I) 'maximin' interpreted in terms of utilities, focusing on the welfare level of the worst-off in any group to arrive at a social-welfare ordering. This makes the 'worst-off rank' something like a dictator, and though it is not a personal dictatorship, it is possible to argue that it is a rather extreme approach. It appears that with interpersonal comparability without cardinality, the tendency towards such 'rank-dictatorships' (e.g. the dictatorship of the mth rank) is considerable, and it is possible to exclude all other possibilities by relatively small extensions of the Arrow conditions, given the welfarist (or strict-ranking welfarist) structure (see Gevers, 1976; Roberts, 1976 The difficulties with welfarism discussed in Sections II-IV arose from combining it with poor utility information. I would now like to dispute the acceptability of welfarism even when utility information is as complete as it can possibly be. So ordinalism is dropped, and the use of cardinal measures is permitted, and even -more demandingly -ratio scale measures (permitting statements such as: utility U1 is twice U2). To go as far as is logically conceivable, we can even demand that utility numbers be simply unique (and not just unique up to any positive affine transformation as under cardinality, or unique up to any positive homogeneous linear transformation as under a ratio-scale measure). Interpersonal comparisons are also extreme in the sense that each person's utility numbers -unique as they are -correspond naturally to those of others in a one-to-one way. These requirements are very demanding indeed, but since the object is to criticise welfarism even when utility information is as good as it can conceivably be, this only makes the exercise more biased in favour of welfarism. If utility information is, in fact, weaker than that, then of course welfarism will be even less (rather than more) acceptable. Consider a set of three social states x, y and z, with the following utility numbers for persons I and 2 (there are no others). In x person I is hungry while 2 is eating a great deal. In y person 2 has been made to surrender a part of his food supply to I. While 2 is made worse off, I gets more utility, and the sum total of utility happens to be larger (with diminishing marginal utility). It is clear that y must be judged to be better than x by utilitarianism (since the utility sum is larger for y), by the so called 'Rawlsian maximin' or its lexicographic extension 'leximin' (since the worst-off person's utility is larger in y than in x), and indeed by virtually all the equity criteria that have been proposed in the literature using utility data (see, for example, Phelps (I973), Sen (I973), Hammond (I976a), d'Aspremont and Gevers (I977), Deschamps and Gevers (I978), and Kern (I978)). Let us take y to be better than x.
Consider now z. Here person I is still just as hungry as in x, and person 2 iS also eating just as much. However, person i, who is a sadist, is now permitted to torture 2, who -alas -is not a masochist. So 2 does suffer, but resilient as he is, his suffering is less than the utility gain of the wild-eyed I. The utility numbers in z being exactly the same as in y, welfarism requires that if y is preferred to x, then so must be z. But y is socially preferred to x. So z is preferred to x as well, thanks to welfarism.'
The conclusion that z can be socially preferred to x can, of course, be directly derived using utilitarianism, maximin, leximin, or some utility-based equity criterion. However, we might wonder whether those approaches should be used in the case ofjudging torture. (Cf. Harsanyi's (I978), p. 8, rejection of utilitarian calculus in the case of 'sadism, resentment, or malice'.) But the decision to rank y over x by any of these criteria in a choice involving no judgement of torture, will readily translate into a preference for torture-inclusive z over x, due to welfarism.
Similarly, if our disapproval of the torture leads us to prefer x to z (or at least to a refusal to rank z better than x), then welfarism will require that we must rank x above y as well, thereby opposing the food transfer (or at least refuse to approve of the food transfer). Welfarism is a demanding restriction.
It is interesting to consider also the ranking of y vis-a-vis z. By the Pareto indifference rule, y and z must be judged to be socially indifferent. If instead of passing on some food from rich 2 to poor I, letting I torture 2 gives both exactly the same utilities, then Paretianism obliges us to declare the two alternatives to be exactly as good as each other. If we wish to make a moral distinction between y and z despite their coincidence on utility space, we have to go not merely against welfarism in general, but even against that limited expression of welfarism that we find in the Paretian approach. This issue is pursued further in the next section.
While the subject of torture arouses moral feelings that are very deep, there are also other subjects on which the inadequacy of the utility informationhowever complete in itself-seems important. Indeed, some moral principles are formulated without making any use of utility information at all, e.g. 'equal pay for equal work', 'non-exploitation',2 etc., and it is easy to demonstrate that these principles would conflict with welfarism, which makes the utility information decisive. Even Rawls's (I97I) 'difference principle' in his theory of justice, in which a person's disadvantage is judged in terms of his access to ' primary social goods', and not in terms of utility as such (as in the apocryphal version popular among economists), will clash violently with welfarism. In its uncompromising rejection of the relevance of non-utility information welfarism is indeed a very limiting approach.
Finally, there is the question of data availability. Often utility information is very difficult to obtain both because of problems of measurability and comparability, as well as because of well-known difficulties in inducing honest revelation of preferences (see Gibbard Consider the first example in terms of which I tried to illustrate the result 1 The problem of data availability will not, of course, arise in this form if individual utility is defined as the component of social welfare that is attributed to the conditions of that individual, in a 'separable' social welfare framework (see Hammond, 1977) . Indeed, with such a framework and with that definition of individual utility, welfarism would be an analytic requirement of consistency. But welfarism in this case is not a substantial claim, and only shows social welfare to be a function of its own components (e.g. the sum of the parts -to take the simplest form). The really interesting controversial issues will, then, arise in the correspondence between individual utility (as the person's own conception of his own wellbeing) and the component of social welfare that is attributed to him ('utility' in this rather artificial sense).
2 See Sen (1979b). In the torture case discussed in the last section a distinction was made between utility arising from getting some food when hungry and that arising from torturing. In the current context, it is possible to make a distinction between utility arising from reading a book one wants to read and that arising from someone else's discomfiture. And between suffering arising from having to read something one hates to read, and suffering arising from the contemplation of someone else enjoying what one regards to be bad stuff. If it is decided to ignore the utility arising from the discomfiture of others, or disutility from the enjoyment of others (or to put a lower weight on these things rather than ignoring them altogether), then distinctions are being made between different kinds of utility, using non-utility information.' Indeed, it is possible that the prude and -the lewd themselves would make a moral judgement in favour of the lewd reading the book -despite its Pareto inferiority. This they can do for the reasons mentioned above, and they can do this even without apologising for their own actual utility functions. The 1 See Sen (I 976 a), pp. 235-7 . This type of consideration also provides a way of resolving Gibbard's (1974) important problem of consistency of libertarian rights, on which see Suzumura (1978 This reasoning is also relevant to an interesting objection that has been raised about the formulation of the Pareto libertarian problem. If people always act in a way that would maximise their utilities, then the libertarian solution that the lewd reads the book will not be an equilibrium. It would be foolish for the prude to exercise his right not to read the book, since the alternative (the lewd reading it) is even worse for the prude. Indeed, it will be in the interest of both parties to do a 'trade' and arrive at a contract ensuring that the prude reads the book. This will lead to more utility for both. Doesn't this solve the problem of the Paretian libertarian?' Doesn't the possibility of the trade make the allegedly libertarian solution (namely the lewd reading the book) unsustainable and, therefore, unviable? Since a Pareto-inoptimal situation in the circumstances specified would fail to be an equilibrium, doesn't this eliminate the force of the criticism of the Pareto principle?
We may begin by noting that the prude or the lewd may refuse to enter into such a 'trade' despite utility gain, if he is libertarian enough to see no moral gain in the 'trade' (namely the 'deal' involving the prude reading a book that he detests to prevent the lewd reading it with pleasure). Indeed, he can reason with John Stuart Mill :2 There are many who consider as an injury to themselves any conduct which they have a distaste for, and resent it as an outrage to their feelings; ... but there is no parity between the feeling of a person for his own opinion, and the feeling of another who is offended at his holding it; no more than between the desire of a thief to take a purse, and the desire of the right owner to keep it. And a person's taste is as much his own peculiar concern as his opinion or his purse. [Mill (1859) a person will be seen as maximising his utility in every feasible choice. But this assertion, then, is no more than a tautology. If, on the other hand, utility is taken in the traditional sense of happiness, or in the sense of a person's own conception of his well-being, then to identify that utility as invariably the same as the binary relation revealed by his consistent choice, would produce an immensely limited model of human behaviour.' It may be useful to distinguish between three types of cases. First, as outlined above, one or more of the parties may refuse to enter into the 'trade' and reject it on moral grounds. Here the libertarian solution of the lewd reading the book need not fail to be an equilibrium. Second, one or more of the parties may think the 'trade' to be immoral on libertarian grounds, but may decide nevertheless to indulge in the 'trade'; akrasia or the weakness of will is not an uncommon problem. Here the libertarian solution will fail to be an equilibrium, but it will not go against a unanimous moral judgement (despite going against a unanimous utility ranking). The rejection of the Paretian ranking in either or both of these cases is adequate for the purpose of rejecting the Pareto principle, since the principle is meant to apply without qualification.
Violation of the Pareto principle would be, however, a good deal more controversial in the third case in which neither party disapproves of the trade and both in fact would proceed to such a deal.2 It raises a deeper question, viz., whether having a right based on the 'personal' nature of some decisions (in this case the right to read what one likes and shun what one does not wish to read) must invariably imply being free to trade that right for some other gain, irrespective of the nature of the gain (in this case the lewd's gain consists in getting pleasure from the prude's discomfiture, and the prude's gain in avoiding the discomfort of knowing that the lewd is reading a book that he -the prudedisapproves of). If the answer to this question is yes, then clearly the criticism of the Pareto principle would not apply to this case. I believe it is possible to question such an affirmative answer, but I resist the temptation to go further into this complex issue, since for the purpose at hand, viz., the rejection of the Pareto principle (given its unconditional character), the other two cases are sufficient.
Before ending this section, I would like to take up two general issues. First, using a deontological approach, it is possible to include considerations of liberty 1 The characterisation of human behaviour as being based exclusively on the pursuit of one's own happiness (or one's own sense of well-being) irrespective of moral values, social conventions, or ties of class or community, produces a model of breathtaking simplicity. I have tried to analyse elsewhere the consequences of characterising human beings in this way; see Sen (1977c) .
2 There is, however, still the problem of enforcing such a deal, and it is not altogether obvious how the lewd could ensure that the prude having got the book would, in fact, read it. This would make the trade that much more difficult to execute. See also Olson's (I965) general discussion of the difficulties of contractive action: 'it does not follow, because all of the individuals in a group would gain if they achieved their group objective, that they would act to achieve that objective, even if they were all rational and self-interested' (p. 2). But while trade may fail to take place for such instrumental difficulties, that would not be, it seems to me, a reason for denying that the trade would have been in the interest of social welfare. The actual failure of the trade would not, thus, weaken the force of the Paretian welfare judgement in this situation, and if the Pareto principle has to be rejected in this third case, the argument must be found elsewhere. In fact, the issue of feasibility is a distinct one from that of social desirability, and this has to be borne in mind both in criticising the Pareto principle (say, in case 2) as well as in defending it (say, in case 3). However, the role that is given to the Pareto principle in this approach may well be very limited (and quite possibly, vacuous) in terms of actual activities. While 'rights do not determine a social ordering but instead set the constraints within which a social choice is to be made', 'a choice can be made by a social choice mechanism based upon a social ordering, if there are any choices left to make!' (Nozick (I974), p. i66). Furthermore it can be argued that including considerations of liberty and rights in the evaluation of outcomes themselves also has some advantages, especially in dealing with 'third-party moralities', e.g. person 3's moral involvement in letting strong-armed I torture or rape, or exploit, person 2, when it is in 3's power to stop it. If the violation of rights were reflected into the evaluation of states of affairs themselves, then a consequence-based analysis of right action would involve 3 directly into the event. If, on the other hand, this violation does not make the state of affairs any worse, and rights merely 'set the constraints within which a social choice is to be made' then it is not immediate that person 3 has any involvement in this episode at all.3 Finally, it is perhaps worth remarking that the criticism of the Pareto principle under discussion does not dispute the use of 'dominance' as a way of separating out non-controversial choices, which do not involve conflicting considerations, from choices that do. If utility were accepted to be the only basis of moral claim, then the Pareto principle would indeed reflect 'dominance' of moral claims, and would be -accordingly -quite non-controversial. The difficulty, however, arises from accepting other sources of moral claim. This leads to the specification of claims that do not rest on utility considerations, or which require a revision of the relative weighting of different elements in aggregate utility values (e.g. attaching more weight to the prude's displeasure from having himself to read a book he does not like vis-'a-vis his displeasure THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL [SEPTEMBER from the knowledge that somebody else is enjoying reading that book). The Pareto principle (i) lists a set of virtues, and (ii) uses dominance of virtues as the criterion. What is in dispute here is the former, not the latter.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
I shall not attempt a summary of the arguments presented in this paper, but will make a few general remarks, to put the discussion in perspective. First, all the properties on which 'something like a general consensus' seems to exist in traditional welfare economics (Section I) are eminently questionable.
Second, Arrow's impossibility theorem can be seen as resulting largely from combining 'welfarism' (ruling out the use of non-utility information) with remarkably poor utility information (especially because of the avoidance of interpersonal comparisons) (Sections II and III).
Third, the power of these combined informational exclusions can be illustrated by noting that in the exercise of aggregating the conflicting interests of the poor vis-a-vis the rich, the exclusions make it, in effect, impossible to give priority to the interest of the poor. The poor cannot be distinguished for this purpose from the rich -neither in terms of utility, nor in terms of income or other non-utility information (Section III). There are many different ways of avoiding the impasse: dropping welfarism is one, using richer utility information is another (Section V).
Fourth, the Arrow impossibility result translates readily to the BergsonSamuelson social welfare function as well, precisely to the extent that it too tries to combine welfarism with poor utility information (Section IV).
Fifth, while welfarism is disastrous when the utility information is poor, it remains a very limiting constraint even when the utility information is very rich (Section VI). This can be brought out by explicitly considering such issues as liberty, discrimination, exploitation, or entitlement to social security. The underlying principles tend to give non-utility information a role of its own (in addition to any relevance it might have as determinant of -or as surrogate for -utility data).
Finally, Paretianism can be seen essentially as a weak version of welfarismbanning any independent use of non-utility information in a class of special cases. Even this apparently mild exclusion of non-utility information has highly restrictive consequences, especially for issues related to liberty (Section VII). While escape from these difficulties has been sought in the possibility of 'trading' one's rights, it is argued that this does not dispose of the case against the Pareto principle. 
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